



Proprietary Estoppel: Widening the Net 
 
 
Mark Pawlowski and James Brown consider whether a proprietary 
estoppel claim can extend to property other than land 
 
 
Most of the case law on the entitlement to family assets is concerned with disputes 
concerning beneficial ownership of the matrimonial (or quasi-matrimonial) home. 
This, of course, is not surprising given that the family home is likely to be the most 
substantial asset acquired by the parties during the period of their marriage or 
cohabitation.  Disputes about property ownership, however, may not always be 
confined to the home and may include entitlement to other assets such as chattels 
owned by one of the parties. In this context, the doctrine of proprietary estoppel 
(which readily applies to land) have been far less developed by the courts although, in 
principle, there seems little reason why they should not form the basis of entitlement 
in appropriate cases.  
 
 
Comparison with promissory estoppel 
 
Under English law, proprietary (like promissory) estoppel is a species of equitable 
estoppel. Whilst the requirements of inducement and detrimental reliance are broadly 
the same for both, one important distinction is that promissory estoppel cannot 
generate an independent cause of action since it is concerned primarily with 
preventing a contracting party from resiling from his representations or promises if 
the other party has acted in reliance on them: Coombe v Coombe [1951] 2 KB 215, at 
224; Baird Textile Holdings Ltd v Marks & Spencer plc [2001] EWCA Civ 274 and 
White v Riverside Housing Association Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1385. By contrast, 
proprietary estoppel may be used not only as a “shield” in defence of an action by the 
legal owner but also as a “sword” capable of grounding a distinct and separate cause 
of action in equity. In this sense, the estoppel is capable of creating rights in property 
on behalf of the claimant who has successfully asserted an equity based on assurance 





There is no direct English authority on the question whether the doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel is applicable exclusively to chattels as well as realty.  Until 
recently, all the cases have concerned the application of the doctrine to rights and 
interests in and over land. There are, however, several dicta which suggest that the 
estoppel may not be limited to land. In Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd v Twitchings 
[1976] QB 225, Lord Denning MR drew no distinction between goods or land when 
discussing the application of the doctrine.  He stated, at p. 242: 
 
“There are many cases where the true owner of goods or of land has led 
another to believe that he is not the owner, or, at any rate, is not claiming an 




cases it has been held repeatedly that the owner is not allowed to go back on 
what he has led the other to believe. So much so that his own title to the 
property, be it land or goods, has been held to be limited or extinguished, and 
new rights and interests have been created therein. And this operates by reason 
of his conduct – what he has led the other to believe – even though he never 
intended it.” (Emphasis added). 
 
This view was cited with apparent approval in Western Fish Products Ltd v Penwith 
District Council [1981] 2 All ER 204, at 218, where Megaw LJ, delivering the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal, opined that the principle of proprietary estoppel 
“may extend to other forms of property.” In the Baird Textile case, referred to above, 
Mance LJ defined the scope of proprietary estoppel as “probably” extending  to other 
property: at [97]. Similarly, Sir Andrew Morritt V-C, referring to the Western case, 
characterised the estoppel as creating “a cause of action . . . limited to cases involving 
property rights, whether or not confined to land”: at [34]. The third member of the 
Court of Appel, Judge LJ, stated that “the principles relating to proprietary estoppel 
are limited to ‘rights and interests created in and over land’ and, possibly ‘to other 
forms of property’”: at [54]. Similarly, in Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd  
[2008] 1 WLR 1752, Lord Scott, stated, at [14]:  
 
“The estoppel becomes a “proprietary” estoppel  - a sub-species of promissory 
estoppel – if the right claimed is a proprietary right, usually a right to or over 
land but, in principle, equally available in relation to chattels or choses in 
action.” 
 
Again, in Thorner v Major [2009] 1 WLR 776, at [61], Lord Walker referred to 
proprietary estoppel as having to “relate to identified property (usually land) owned 
(or, perhaps, about to be owned) by the defendant.”  
 
 
The deceased’s net estate 
 
More significantly, in several cases, the doctrine has been invoked so as to include the 
deceased’s residuary personalty as well as land. Thus, in Re Basham, (deceased) 
[1986] 1 WLR 1498, the deceased’s net estate comprised a cottage, furniture and 
other chattels and some cash in a current and deposit account. The deceased had 
assured the claimant that she would inherit all his property on his death. The court 
drew no distinction between the various items of the deceased’s property, referring 
simply to the claimant’s equity as extending to the whole of the net estate. Similarly, 
in Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA Civ 159, the deceased’s estate comprised not only a 
house (valued at £420,000) but also furniture (worth about £15,000) and £583,615 on 
deposit. Here again, neither Weeks J (at first instance) nor the Court of Appeal made 
any distinction in respect of these assets when considering the applicability of the 
doctrine. In both courts, it was tacitly assumed that the estoppel would extend to the 
whole of the deceased’s property: see also, Ottey v Grundy [2002] EWHC 2858 (Ch) 
and [2003] EWCA Civ 1176, where the successful estoppel claim related to an 
apartment in Jamaica (valued at £36,000) and a life interest in a houseboat moored in 
Chelsea, London, (estimated at £280,000); and Murphy v Rayner [2011] EWHC 1 
(Ch), (land and investments) and Pascoe v Turner [1979] 1 WLR 431, (house and 








The doctrine was applied to an insurance policy in Re Foster, Hudson v Foster (No. 2) 
[1938] 3 All ER 610 and Strover v Strover [2005] EWHC 860 (Ch). More recently, 
proprietary estoppel was invoked in the context of a licence in respect of intellectual 
property involving copyrights.  In Motivate Publishing FZ LLC v Hello Ltd [2015] 
EWHC 1554 (Ch), Birss J, stated, at [60]-[61]: 
 
“The licence would be permission to publish the Middle East edition of Hello 
magazine. The reason it is a licence is because the defendant (or the 
Hello/Hola group) holds intellectual property rights which I can take it would 
otherwise be infringed if Motivate published a version of Hello magazine 
without permission. In English law those intellectual property rights consist of 
goodwill, know-how, copyright and perhaps design rights. I can think of no 
reason in principle why a proprietary estoppel should not be available to the 
claimants in this case to prevent the defendant from denying the existence of a 
licence of this kind. It would be a right enforceable by the claimants against 
the defendant. The fact that the licence is a licence of intellectual property 
rights rather than an interest in land makes no difference. No case has been 
drawn to my attention in which a proprietary estoppel has been refused on that 
ground.” 
 
As one commentator has put it, the decision “is necessarily an incremental step, in 
recognising a more inclusive promise principle beyond promises relating to land; 
however that step is a welcome one”: see, A Shaw-Mellors, “Proprietary Estoppel and 
the Enforcement of Promises”, (2015) Conv. 529. Proprietary estoppel has also been 
applied to an entitlement to a share of profits. In Sutcliffe v Lloyd [2008] EWHC 1329 
(Ch) and [2007] EWCA Civ 153, the claimant had entered into an arrangement with 
the defendants to provide the management, design and construction of a residential 
building development in return for 50 per cent of the share capital and an equal split 
of the profits. In this case, therefore, the interest to which the equitable obligation 
attached was the profit earned on the development and not a share in the enhanced 
value of the land itself. On the evidence, the court held that minimum equity to do 
justice was that the claimant should receive the sum of £25,000.  
 
The doctrine, however, has been held not to apply to a promise simply to pay a sum of 
money for work done by the claimant. In Sami v Hamit [2018] EWHC 1400 (Ch), 
Morgan J held that proprietary estoppel had to relate to property of some kind and a 
claim to payment for work done was more properly the subject of a claim based in 
contract or unjust enrichment.  Similarly, in Newport City Council v Charles [2009] 1 
WLR 1884, the Court of Appeal held that a local authority’s right to possession 
against a person succeeding to a secure tenancy on the death of a family member, on 
the ground that the accommodation was more than he reasonably required, was not an 
interest in land capable of giving rise to a proprietary estoppel. Laws LJ, stated, at 
[27]: 
 
“The housing authority is not claiming an interest in land. Its interest as 




any estoppel. What the housing authority seeks to do is no more nor less than 
to raise a strictly statutory claim to possession in a strictly statutory context. 
That ambition as it seems to me cannot be fulfilled as the fruit of a proprietary 
estoppel. The defendant has not created any expectation that the defendant will 
enjoy any kind of interest in land.” 
 
 
An extension of the doctrine? 
 
Assuming that the doctrine of proprietary estoppel is of general application to 
property other than, strictly speaking, interests in land, there is no reason why a 
spouse or (cohabitee) should not be able to mount a successful claim in equity to a 
family chattel provided he (or she) can establish the requisite elements of an 
assurance and detrimental reliance. The point is vividly illustrated by Elizabeth Cooke, 
in her book, The Modern Law of Estoppel, (2000, OUP), at p. 53: 
 
“If I whisper to you ‘the house is yours, darling’, I may have to make that 
good if you rely on what I say; if I murmur ‘the shares (or the aeroplane or 
piano) are yours, darling’, I am safe as if I said: ‘I will give you £10,000 next 
Monday.” 
 
 In Rowe v Prance  [1999] 2 FLR 787, the claimant was a widow who, for a period of 
14 years had an intimate relationship with the defendant, a married man of 
considerable private means.  During their relationship, he purchased a yacht for 
£172,000 which was registered in his sole name, giving the excuse that a joint 
registration was not possible because the claimant did not possess an ocean master’s 
certificate. The claimant gave up her rented house and put her furniture in storage to 
base herself on the yacht, although she was there predominantly at weekends only, 
spending the remainder of her time in bed and breakfast accommodation.  In a letter to 
the claimant, the defendant promised her that his absences would shortly cease and 
that the yacht would be theirs to share so that they could live together.  Significantly, 
in numerous conversations, both before and after the purchase of the yacht, the 
defendant referred to it as “ours” or “our boat”. Mr Nicholas Warren QC (sitting as a 
deputy judge of the Chancery Division), applying the earlier case in Paul v Constance 
[1977] 1 WLR 527, held that the defendant’s repeated use of the word “our” when 
referring to the yacht and his assurances that the claimant’s “security” was her interest 
in it (coupled with his explanation as to why he alone could be registered as owner) 
evidenced a clear understanding that she had a beneficial interest in the property. On 
the facts, therefore, the defendant had constituted himself a trustee of the yacht for 
himself and the claimant in equal shares.  
  
Let us suppose, however, that in Rowe, the claimant had relied on the defendant’s 
promises by spending her own money on restoring or repairing the yacht. The 
expenditure of money on improvements to the property in reliance on the legal 
owner’s assurance is, of course, a “classic way” in which a detriment can be 
established. In these circumstances, it is submitted, a claim based on proprietary 
estoppel would have also succeeded, giving the claimant an estoppel equity which the 
court would have satisfied by means of an appropriate award which did justice to the 




in the proceeds of sale of the yacht – an outcome which would not differ from the 
actual decision based on a self-declared or constructive trust.  
 
One can also envisage an alternative scenario where the claimant incurs expenditure 
(and labour) in restoring the yacht believing it to be hers. The defendant knows of  her 
mistaken belief and encourages her in the expenditure of her money by abstaining 
from asserting his own legal rights in relation to the property. Here again, the claimant 
would, it is submitted, be able to bring her claim under proprietary estoppel and seek 
an appropriate form of relief in order to satisfy her equity: see, Ramsden v Dyson 
(1866) LR 1 HL 129 and Willmott v Barber (1880) 15 Ch D 96. Significantly, in this 
scenario, a proprietary estoppel claim may be the only form of legal redress open to 
the claimant given that the defendant has not constituted himself as trustee of the 
yacht (unlike the owner of the yacht in Rowe), nor do the facts give rise to any 




Impact on third parties 
 
An interesting feature of being able to successfully invoke the doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel in the above scenarios is that the estoppel claim would generate an inchoate 
equity, itself being an equitable chose in action and, accordingly, a species of property 
right albeit not a full proprietary interest. In the event, therefore, that the defendant 
sold the yacht to a third party prior to the claim being heard by the court, the latter 
would, it is submitted, be bound by the inchoate equity unless he could show that he 
was a bona fide purchaser for value of the yacht without notice of the estoppel claim.  
 
The case of  Gray v Smith [2013] EWHC 4136 (Comm) serves to provide a useful 
analogy, which involved a car dealer purchasing a MacLaren Formula One racing car. 
Mr Gray had instructed a fraudulent dealer to purchase the car for him in the United 
States and to ship it back to England. The fraudster purchased the car, using the £1 
million Mr Gray had already paid, and shipped the same to England. However, the 
fraudster then failed to deliver the car to Mr Gray, but rather transferred title to it to 
another (reputable) dealer so as to settle a debt. This dealer then sold the car to Mr 
Smith. It was held that, when the fraudulent dealer purchased the car, he acquired 
legal title as Mr Gray’s agent, acquired legal title, but held the car on trust for Mr 
Gray, who had the equitable title. However, as the reputable dealer had bought the car 
without actual or constructive notice of Mr Gray’s equitable interest, he had acquired 
the car free from it. The court was persuaded by trade practice which showed that 
such car sales were typically made orally, often over the phone, or with a handshake, 
without any prior need to demand and investigate a documentary chain of title. The 
significance of the decision, for present purposes, is that it provides an analogy with 
the case law on the doctrine of notice which governs the liability of third parties in 
respect of estoppel claims in the context of unregistered land: see, for example, Duke 
of Beaufort v Patrick (1853) 17 Beav 60 and Unity Joint Stock Mutual Banking 
Association v King (1858) 25 Beav 72. In the case of registered land, s.116 of the 
Land Registration Act 2002 provides that an equity by estoppel is capable of binding 





Apart from impacting on purchasers, the estoppel equity has the potential to bind the 
legal owner’s trustee in bankruptcy: see, Re Sharpe (A Bankrupt) [1980] 1 WLR 219, 
(estoppel in the form of an equitable licence). The inchoate equity has also been held 
to bind the legal owner's personal representatives: see, for example, Inwards v Baker 
[1965] 2 QB 29 and Jones (AE) v Jones (FW) [1977] 1WLR 438. Similarly, a 
volunteer successor in title from the legal who has notice of the circumstances from 
which the equity has arisen will be in no better position than that of the owner: Voyce 
v Voyce (1991) 62 P & CR 290. 
 
If, on the other hand, the claimant is successful at the hearing in establishing his or her 
estoppel equity, it would be a matter for the court to determine how best to satisfy the 
equity so as to avoid an unconscionable result and to do justice between the parties. If 
the court grants the claimant a proprietary entitlement to the property (for example, an 
equitable interest under a constructive trust as might have been the case in Rowe), the 
interest so created by the application of the estoppel doctrine would, according to its 
nature, be binding on a purchaser who has actual (or constructive notice) of the 





Although several of the English cases have tacitly assumed that the doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel does apply to chattels where the claim also relates to land, it 
remains to be seen how far the courts will be prepared to go in acknowledging the 
estoppel equity where the subject-matter of the claim is exclusively personalty. In the 
writers’ view, there seems little justification for drawing artificial boundaries between 
different species of property in the estoppel context. As one writer has put it, “it 
would be remarkable if an equitable principle intended to frustrate unconscionable 
conduct was limited to a particular type of property”: see, KR Handley, Estoppel by 
Conduct and Convention, (2006, Sweet & Maxwell), at p. 189. 
. 
 
Points for the practitioner 
 
1. There is no direct English authority on the question whether the doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel is applicable exclusively to chattels as well as realty.  
  
2. There are, however, numerous dicta in the English case law which suggest that 
the estoppel may not be limited to land. In several cases, it has been invoked 
so as to include the deceased’s residuary personalty as well as land. 
 
3. It has also been held to apply to insurance policies and a licence in respect of 
intellectual property rights such as copyrights, but not to an entitlement to a 
share of profits or to a claim to payment for work done. 
 
4. Assuming that the doctrine of proprietary estoppel is of general application to 
property other than, strictly speaking, interests in land, there is no reason why 
a spouse or (cohabitee) should not be able to mount a successful claim in 
equity to a family chattel provided he (or she) can establish the requisite 





5. A significant feature of being able to successfully invoke the doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel is that the estoppel claim would generate an inchoate 
equity capable of binding third parties. If the court grants the claimant a 
proprietary entitlement to the property in satisfaction of the equity, the interest 
so created by the application of the estoppel doctrine may also bind third 
parties who have actual or constructive notice of the circumstances giving rise 
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